Archive for Prairie Power Inc. (PPI)

The Truth About Prairie State Energy Campus (Part 2): Its Coal Isn’t Cheap

‘Annual per ton operating costs of the mine remain higher than those originally assumed …’

TOM SANZILLO, IEEFA

Among the many claims made to dozens of communities across the Midwest and South to induce them to sign onto the Prairie State Energy Campus deal was that it would be supplied by cheap coal from a mine across the street.

Here’s the truth: The coal from Lively Grove Mine isn’t as cheap as Prairie State’s creators and supporters led member cities and towns to believe (we describe our findings in a research memo we posted today).

American Municipal Power in Ohio, Prairie State’s biggest participant in the deal, acknowledges in very recent refinancing documents that “annual per ton operating costs of the mine remain higher than those originally assumed.”

That part is factual enough. The original 2013 budgeted cost of production for Lively Grove coal was $14.44 per ton and the actual cost of production in 2013—the latest figures available—was $18.98 per ton.

This was no small miscalculation, representing a 31 percent understatement.

THE LIVELY GROVE MINE ADVANTAGE IS A MYTH

In presentations by Prairie State officials to member-utility representatives in Cleveland and Batavia, Ill., coal from Lively Grove Mine was touted in cost-favorable terms compared to other coals on the market. That’s because those official cost-of-production figures didn’t include the debt service required to buy and build the mine, an omission that exaggerates any purported cost advantage.

Perhaps Prairie State executives rationalize this omission by the fact that their business model puts state authorities and local governments on the hook for the mine’s debt service while Prairie State itself accounts separately for production costs.

Still, there is no central public ledger that logs both costs. This is an eccentricity, to put it mildly, by industry standards. When coal producers sell coal to a utility or power generator, they typically include in their market price both the cost of production and debt. What Prairie State is doing, by contrast, is an industry anomaly.

This failure to adjust for debt-service costs—by both Prairies State representatives and the consultants representing the respective states and communities—has robbed local officials of any chance to clearly compare Prairie State power costs with those of other generation facilities, particularly other coal-generating facilitiesnew chart

HOW MUCH DOES PRAIRIE STATE’S COAL REALLY COST?

When you include debt service in the acknowledged and over-budget $18.98 price per ton of the coal that Prairie State Energy Campus burns you get a much bigger number than plant proponents will acknowledge: $26.29.

And when you compare the true price of coal from Lively Grove Mine with market prices from competing mines, there’s almost no difference, especially between nearby high-quality Illinois Basin coal and the lower-quality stuff Lively Grove Mine produces. It pans out to about a 1 percent divergence, by our calculations, which is to say Lively Grove Coal is not the big money-saver portrayed in Prairie State’s presentations to member utilities.

Similar lower-quality Powder River Basin coal is only slightly more expensive, which means that Lively Grove isn’t producing coal at any substantial savings even over what it would cost if it were shipped in from Wyoming.

In fact, coal from other Illinois Basin mines, even Powder River Basin mines, actually costs less when you factor in the plant’s operational losses in its first two years and the difficulties the plant has had burning the coal (the low quality of the Lively Grove coal has been cited by plant managers themselves as one of the reasons for Prairie State’s poor performance).

WHY THE TRUE COST OF PRAIRIE STATE’S COAL MATTERS

Electricity from Prairie State Energy Campus costs its member towns and cities roughly twice that of electricity that can be purchased on the open market.

The project has been a mismanaged boondoggle from the beginning. Its construction costs came in substantially over budget, its mine-mouth model does not live up to cost-advantage promises, and it has serious operational problems.

Add to all this two more things: Its tangled finances have never been independently audited and no financial consultant and no local utility administrator has yet sorted out all the many clarifications that member utilities need to help them understand why electricity costs from Prairie State Energy Campus are so out of control.

This much is known:

  • Peabody Energy was paid for the mine and for its development and is still being paid to manage it;
  • Bechtel Corp. was paid for the construction costs, including the overruns;
  • Many investment banks, lawyers and accountants were paid to underwrite the bonds that made it all possible;
  • Hundreds of thousands of households and businesses across the heartland are now paying much more for electricity than they should.

Tom Sanzillo is IEEFA’s director of finance.
link to full article

 

The Truth About Prairie State Energy Campus (Part 1): Failing, Year by Year.

The Plant Doesn’t Run Like It’s Creators said it Would, and Its Electricity Is Overpriced

DAVID SCHLISSEL, IEEFA

Prairie State Energy Campus failed in 2014 — as it failed in 2012 and 2013 — to provide the reliable, low-cost electricity that Peabody Energy, American Municipal Power, and its other promoters promised when they persuaded more than 200 communities around the Midwest to sign long-term contracts to buy power from the plant (we’ve documented these failures in detail in a recent research memo posted here).

The Prairie State promise went like this: the plant would operate at 85 percent capacity, providing a reliable source of electricity to its many member towns and cities, and it would provide electricity at competitive prices.

The ugly and undeniable truth that has emerged over time, however, is that Prairie State Energy Campus has done neither. Its failure can be documented year by year in two ways: by its capacity-factor performance and by its disastrous record in living up to its promise of providing low-cost electricity.
Schlissel 040615
Because the cost of Prairie State electricity is so high, many of the municipal power agencies that issued the $5 billion in bonds for the plant have been under pressure from the communities to make the price more palatable. One way to do this is by refinancing the debt and pushing the payment of the principal into the future, and some of the major municipal power agencies involved did so in late 2014 and early 2015.

These refinancings, combined with better plant operating performance in early 2015, pushed the price of Prairie State electricity down some in January and February—by about 15 percent across American Municipal Power communities, for instance, from the same time period in 2014. However, the market price of power has gone down too, which means Prairie State power is still relatively expensive.

Prairie State Energy Campus has nine owners that sell its electricity to member communities: American Municipal Power (23.26 percent), Illinois Municipal Electric Agency (15.17 percent), Indiana Municipal Power Agency (12.64), Missouri Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission (12.33 percent)

Prairie Power Inc. (8.22 percent), Southern Illinois Power Cooperative (7.9 percent), Kentucky Muni Power Agency (7.82 percent), Northern Illinois Municipal Power Agency (7.6 percent), Peabody Energy subsidiary Lively Grove Energy (5.06 percent).

POOR PEFORMANCE AND HIGH PRICES

Here’s the main two-part breakdown of the plant’s performance from mid-2012, when it opened, through 2014:

  • Failure to operate at promised capacity factor. When it was promoting Prairie State to communities in 2007, AMP cited a study by R.W. Beck, its consultant, to assert that Prairie State would immediately operate at a sustained average 85 percent annual capacity factor. Capacity factor compares how much power a plant actually produces with how much it would have produced if it had run full time at full power over a particular period of time. The higher the capacity factor, the better the plant is operating and the more power it is producing. (The plant’s owners made the same 85 percent claim in the documents used to sell bonds to investors.) The plant’s actual performance in 2012, 2013 and 2014 has fallen far short of the owners’ promises. Prairie State has operated at less than 64 percent capacity since it opened in June 2012, and in 2014 it operated at less than the 78 percent capacity than the owners forecast.
  • Failure to provide either low-cost power or transparency into true costs. In 2014, Prairie State’s operating costs were more than $13 million higher than its owners forecast. The bad-for-ratepayer combination implied here and above—higher costs and lower-than-budgeted generation—means the plant’s actual operating costs in 2014 were 18 percent higher than forecast. AMP has shrouded this fact from customers by relying on accounting practices it calls “rate stabilization and levelization” that defer some of the current true cost of the power from Prairie State. AMP also hides the true cost of Prairie State power in another way: by blending the high cost of Prairie State power with the cost of less expensive “replacement power,” which it buys on the open market when the plant is not operating as well as it was supposed to.

TOWNS AND CITIES WILL NEVER RECOVER MILLIONS IN ALREADY LOST COSTS

Even if Prairie State were to begin to operate finally as well as its owners have been promising since at least 2007, it will remain a lingering albatross around the necks of participating communities.

Towns and cities ensnared by the project will never get back the tens of millions of dollars they have paid since 2012 for the high cost of Prairie State electricity. And for decades to come, should they choose to continue their current relationship with Prairie State Energy Campus, they will continue to pay higher prices than necessary. This would mean increasingly uncompetitive electricity rates; deferred investment in maintenance and new projects; layoffs; and pressure to use other taxpayer resources to finance this mistake.

Over the rest of this week, we’ll be posting further commentaries and research that explore some of the rock-bottom problems with the plant and that detail how the municipal economic damage has reaches far and wide. We’ll note also that any impetus for finding the light at the end of this tunnel will most likely come from someplace other than Prairie State Energy Campus itself.
David Schlissel is IEEFA’s director of resource planning analysis.

Link to original post

 

 

Five companies show interest in Danville Power & Light

By Denice Thibodeau, The Register Bee  - VIRGINIA – “Representatives from five electric utilities said they are interested in acquiring all or part of Danville Power & Light on Monday — if the Danville Utility Commission decides to sell it.

AEP/Appalachian Power, Dominion Virginia Power, Mecklenburg Electric Cooperative, Duke Energy and Central Virginia Electric Cooperative representatives attended a meeting at the Municipal Building to get a short overview of DP&L’s assets, power supply and customer base.

Jason Grey, interim director of utilities, told the group the book value of the utility is $180 million and, despite drops in population in recent years ‘our energy consumption has remained the same.'”…

Full article

Danville, VA is the largest AMP participant in Prairie State, at 49.76 MW.

 

Hermann takes legal action to leave energy consortium

The Advertiser Courier –  MISSOURI – “Hermann today made good on its pledge to take legal action to get out of a consortium of nearly three dozen Missouri cities that purchases electricity for resale to their residents and businesses.

The lawsuit filed Thursday morning in Gasconade County Circuit Court aims to have a court allow Hermann to leave the program administered by the Missouri Joint Municipal Electrical Utility Commission. That program involves the purchase of electricity through the Missouri Public Energy Pool (MoPEP).

Hermann officials argue that the cost of being in the program is too great and steadily increasing. Officials cite high utility bills as one factor in a population loss seen in recent years.

The cost of the energy program most recently prompted the Board of Aldermen to approve a 150-percent increase in the monthly meter fee charged to residents and businesses. The meter fee for residents was bumped from $12 a month to $30 a month.”

Full article

 

City leaders, GRO Missouri urge new look at power plant contract

 

Amanda LaBrot, KOMU 8 Reporter - COLUMBIA – “City leaders and GRO Missouri want the city to reevaluate its long-term contract with a major coal burning power plant.

Columbia signed a 40-year contract with Prairie State Energy Campus, in Marissa, Ill., in 2006 to provide the city with coal- generated energy. The city buys about a quarter of its energy from Prairie State, and Councilperson Ian Thomas and Gretchen Maune of GRO Missouri said they had some concerns.

‘It’s a 40-year contract. That’s a long time to keep using coal power with global warming and everything else,’ Maune said.

Thomas said, ‘In addition to locking us into burning fossil fuels for the next forty years, thereby undermining our ability to transition to clean energy, this contract gives us no ability to negotiate the price of the energy we purchase.’…

Full article

 

Prairie Power Inc. (PPI)

Prairie Power, Inc. is a member-owned, not-for-profit electric generation and transmission cooperative, which produces and supplies wholesale electricity to 10 electric distribution cooperatives in central Illinois. PPI’s distribution cooperatives provide retail electric service to approximately 78,000 consumers within their local service territories. PPI is one of more than 60 generation and transmission (G&T) cooperatives that supply wholesale electricity to rural utilities in the United States.

PPI owns and operates approximately 590 miles of transmission lines at 138 kV, 69 kV and 34.5 kV; 141 MW of oil and gas-fired peaking units; and 78 distribution and transmission substations to serve its members. PPI is also one of 9 public utility partners in the Prairie State Generating Company (PSGC), a limited liability corporation responsible for the ownership, construction and future operation of the Prairie State Energy Campus (PSEC). The PSEC is a 2 unit 1600 megawatt supercritical electric generation station scheduled to come on line in late 2012.

Complete list of member communities